Book Review: Psychology and the Law by Mehler, Irving M.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 45
Issue 3 Winter 1961-1962 Article 14
Book Review: Psychology and the Law
Irving M. Mehler
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Irving M. Mehler, Book Review: Psychology and the Law, 45 Marq. L. Rev. 473 (1962).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol45/iss3/14
BOOK REVIEW
Dwight G. McCarty, Psychology and the Law: Prentice-Hall, Inc., New
Jersey, 463 Pp., 1960.
The lawyer of our time is charged with difficult and at times with
grave responsibilities toward society; these responsibilities, for the most
part, cannot effectively be met by being "just a lawyer." As an eminent
jurist once remarked:
The lawyer ... occupies a peculiar position in human affairs,
and from that position stem certain common experiences. The
lawyer stands o.n middle ground. His sphere is swept by all the
currents of life, especially its cross-currents. He is brought into
contact with all kinds of people. He is the private go-between, the
public intermediary, the international diplomat. The boundaries of
all classes, all trades, and all professions. He is doctor and priest,
yet he is necessarily more of a philosopher than the doctor of
medicine and more of a scientist than the priest of religion. In
analyzing human emotions he is a psychologist; in playing upon
human emotions he is an artist; in marshaling facts to support
his theses he is a logician. In business he is a statesman; in state-
craft he is a business man; in politics he is a humanist. In all
things he is a moralist. But in adjusting his principles to the arts
of his profession he is a consummate sophist. He is a philosopher
gone to market; a poet gone to court; a mental warrior fighting
for peace.'
No statement could more poignantly express the principle that law
is greatly dependent upon extra-legal disciplines for its effective func-
tioning. Law is not an isolated profession, but rather is a spear that
cuts through practically every other aspect of learning. Legal educators,
jurists and attorneys are becoming increasingly aware of the need to
be skilled in areas "outside the law." Accordingly, and as a link in this
constructive chain of thought, Mr. McCarty has provided an instruc-
tional guide and informational medium in the field of legal psychology
to assist members of the legal profession in becoming more nearly
"professionals in versatility."' 2 In short, this book is recommended to
any lawyer who wishes to make his profession more meaningful to him
in the light of psychological superimposition on legal relationships.
The format of this work and its usefulness to the practitioner may
be readily gleaned from its interesting and thought provoking "Table
of Contents." For example, chapters such as "Detecting the Liar,"
"Facial and Bodily Expression," "Knowing the Client," "Psychology
and the Law of Evidence," and "Bias," provide plenty of grist for the
1 Wilkin, Preface to Wilkin, Eternal Lawyer at XI (1947).
2 Leach, Property Law Taught in Two Packages, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 28, 30 (1948).
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legal mill. The author's thesis is that modern psychology is the very
lifeblood of a lawyer's practice. Accordingly, he states:
Human nature is the riddle of the universe. It is the constant
factor in the affairs of life, and yet the ever varying element, as
it changes with the individual-a paradox that seems never to be
resolved. The question of human nature [therefore] becomes the
problem of every human transaction. 3
In a chapter entitled "Motive," Mr. McCarty states that "motives
define the problem and determine the conditions of its solution so that
the problem has been solved when the motivating conditions have been
satisfied." Justice Holmes said many years ago, "The law is made to
govern men through their motives. . .. -4 What are the forces that moti-
vate activity in all the myriad affairs of life? Why does one judge sen-
tence an offender to fifteen years of imprisonment while another judge,
in a practically identical situation, imposes only a five year sentence?
Mr. McCarty provides searching answers based on human motives. His
study assists one to better understand human behavior as circumscribed
by law.
Consciously and unconsciously, there is a tendency at times to
evaluate human beings, when no previous contact has been made. How
reliable is such a judgment? The author, in his chapter on "Facial and
Bodily Expression," gives the reader some insights into this fascinating,
yet highly beguiling, study.
A large aspect of the same subject, perhaps, is his chapter on "Bias."
There the reader is soon made aware of the basic premise that individ-
ual action is influenced to a great degree by ingrained tendencies. Man
does not sit serenely at the center of things and cooly decide which of
the given ideas and positions he shall choose. In all situations, there
are influences at work guiding that decision, whether or not he is con-
scious of the fact. The lawyer is therefore alerted to the fact that he
must never lose his perspective of man in spite of human failing and
unfathomable circumstances.
The chapter entitled "Responsibility and the Criminal Law" is prob-
ably one of the most stimulating and informative chapters in this book.
Here, the author traces the history of criminal responsibility in relation
to insanity from the early common law "counting-twenty-pense" test
of Fitzherbert5 down to the "McNaghten" rule6 and further on down
through the historic case which has caused widespread comment in our
era-Durham v. United States.7
3 MCCARTY, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 5 (1960).
4Holmes, The Common Law, p. 61 (1881).
5Referred to by HAWKINS, 1 PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2, fn.; and Slaundeforde,
Pr. Reg. 34.
610 Clark & Finnelly 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
7214 F. 2d 862 (1954).
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In this chapter, the author also discusses the early classic case of
Pike v. New Hampshire" and its far-reaching effect in our own era. In
that memorable case, Justice Doe of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court argued that the McNaghten formula was false and should be
rejected. In addition, the early-yet bold-New Hampshire Supreme
Court discarded the "right and wrong" test of the McNaghten rule.
Whether the defendant had a mental disease and whether the act was
the product of that disease were facts to be determined by the jury from
medical evidence.
Mr. McCarty points out that this was a precedent-shattering opinion.
It laid down no rule or formula as to insanity, but left those questions
to the jury to be based on the medical testimony of experts. But for
some reason the decision did not take hold and remained unheralded
for some eighty-five years until the Durham case of our own era brought
it into legal prominence.
The Durham case, which in substance held that an accused is not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease, opened the door to new thinking on the subject. For under this
rule the psychiatrist can testify to the facts from the medical stand-
point, unhampered by any hard and fast legal requirements.
The full impact of the Durham rule that is now slowly beginning to
unfold is that there is no restriction to any one set of symptoms, nor is
there any narrow "test" to be applied. The jury, under this "old-new
rule," as any jury in any criminal case, has the right to hear all the
competent evidence and find the facts based on this evidence.
The author points out:
This is a long step forward in correlating the psychiatric and
legal views. Being that the law is interested in the criminal re-
sponsibility, and the psychiatrist is interested in the mental con-
dition, by freely showing the facts as to that mental condition,
the jury can determine the legal responsibility of the defendant.
Actually, the Durham case and its recognition of the New Hampshire
rule of the early Pike case, with its realistic approach, has made the
first important break in the long battle to modernize the law of insanity
vis-a-vis twentieth century thinking on the subject.9
Closely aligned to the trail blazing decision in Durham v'. United
States, Mr. McCarty has set forth two thought provoking chapters deal-
ing with the modem view regarding the treatment of prisoners in crim-
inal cases. The chapters entitled "The Psychiatric Examination of
849 N.H. 399 (1871).
9 For an excellent discussion of the Durham case see Douglas, The Durham




Prisoners" and "Disordered Personalities" supply the reader with much
valuable information and food for thought in the field of criminal re-
sponsibility. Certainly, it would seem to be a step in the right direction
to have anyone who is indicted for a crime submitted to a psychiatric
laboratory for examination before trial.
"Knowing the Client" is the most valuable chapter in this book be-
cause it alerts the lawyer once again to the important fact that each
client is to be treated as a distinct individual and in accordance wih his
own unique personality. The author points out that there are still some
general principles-which he discusses in detail-which are most im-
portant to heed and to apply at nearly all times and in nearly all cases.
And above all, the lawyer is warned that if he is to maintain the undi-
minished respect of his client, he must so train himself as to be the
master of the situation at all times.
Throughout the book, one discovers a thread of heightened feeling
and respect for the noblest of professions-the law. The author, a prac-
ticing attorney for over half of a century, has merged his vast erudition
with his extensive experience to produce a compact and handy reference
tool in the field of inter-personal and psychological-legal relationships.
The author's style of writing lures the reader to his last chapter where
he explains that ethical considerations can be no more excluded from
the administration of justice than Polonius from Shakespeare's play
"Hamlet."
The book is replete with interesting, stimulating and well-annotated
sources. He draws examples from the field of legal psychology, some
of which serve the purpose of refreshing a lagging recollection.
Undoubtedly, many readers will find that the author could have
dwelt upon many other areas of law, but remembering that this is one
of the few works in this field, the author is to be commended for his
"pioneering" efforts. He has done his job well in seeking to blend with-
in the law a practical psychology with a lofty, yet basic, morality to
govern human conduct within the total framework of the law.
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